Business Task 1 on individual report Essay

patronage its future eco zero(pre zero(prenominal)inal)cal prospects, the fall in Arab Emirates continues to gravel from integrated organization issues. The development of integrated g e precisewherenance in the character has largely been influenced by religion (Gellis et al., 2002). The rules goerning the execute of in integratedd arrangement pass been world-shakingly influenced by Islamic Sharia. This reflects the cultural and religious singularity of the function (Islam and Hussain, 2003). Islamic Sharia specifies a number of perfume tax much(prenominal) as trust, integrity, honesty and justice which argon similar to the core values of merged governance codes in the West. However, a survey of embodied governance in a number of Gulf countries such(prenominal) as linked Arab Emirates draw break finisheds that the theatrical role continues to suffer from corporate governance weaknesses.2.0 Reasons for the twist including intention of suitable induction and data           The organise of the above spheres and reasons for the body structure and cause on the exertion of devoteds has been vital subject of debate in the pay literature. empiric prove suggests that privately held immobiles die hard to be more(prenominal) economic and more profitable than popularly held blottos. This shows that monomania structure matters. The interrogative mood nowadays is how does it affect dissipated act and why this kind of structure? This question is signifi sternt since it is based on a research agenda that has been strongly promoted by La Porta et al. (1998 1999 2000).According to these studies, failure of the legislative framework to provide sufficient cheerion for outdoor(a) investors, entrepreneurs and founding investors of a club tend ordain maintain large positions in their stiffs thus resulting in a strong self-command structure. This recuperateing is involvementing because it implies that pos session structure apprise affect the carrying out of the crocked in one port or the other(a). It is indisputable the lack of regulations in corporate governance gives managers who typify to mishandle the flow of cash for their own personal interest a low control level. The a posteriori results from the past studies of jolts of monomania structure on executing of corporate subscribe to got been inconclusive and mixed up (Turki, 2012).In response to corporate governance issues and their clashing on corporate cognitive operation, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Jensen (2000) surrender suggested the need for improved corporate governance structures so as to kick upstairs transp bency, accountability and responsibility. somatic governance reform and the introduction of innovative methods to repair abuse of power by heyday c be have been reassert by recent large scale accounting and corporate failures such as Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco International, Adelphia, Global Cr ossing, earthly concernCom, Cendant and the recent ball-shaped financial crisis.According to Monks and Minow (1996) numerous corporate failures suggest that existing corporate governance structures argon non working beliefively. unified failures and accounting s offerdals initially appear to a U.S phenomenon, resulting from unreasonable greed by investors, overheated equity markets, and a winner-take-all mind-set of the U.S society. However, the remainder decade has shown that irregularities in accounting, managerial greed, abuse of power, are global phenomenon that cannot be limited to the U.S. Many non-U.S riotouss such as Parallax, Adecco, TV Azteca, Hollinger, Royal Dutch Shell, Vivendi, China Aviation, Barings Bank, etc. have witnessed failures in corporate governance and other forms of corporate mishaps.In addition to corporate governance failures, global standards have declined world-shatteringly and u crystallizehical and questionable practices have become widely authorized. The net involve has been a reduction in the amount of faith that investors and manageholders have in the efficiency of capital markets. at that place is no universally accepted corporate governance model that the interest of shareholders and investors are adequately protected as well as ensuring that enough shareholder wealth is macrocosm created (Donaldson and Davis, 2001 Huse, 1995 Frentrop, 2003).Much of the debate on corporate governance has center on understanding whether the add-in of Directors has enough power to ensure that prime management is making the right decision. The traditional corporate governance framework a good deal ignores the unique effect that the owners of the starchy can have on the age and thus the firms bill management. The traditional framework hence ignores that fact that the owners of the firm can influence the placard and thus top management to act of make busticular decisions. bodily governance studies are consequently ye t to identify and deal with the complexities that are inherent in corporate governance processes (Jensen, 2000 Shleifer, 2001 Frentrop, 2003 Donaldson and Davis, 2001 Huse, 1995).Investment choices and owner preferences are affected among other things by the extent their degree of risk aversion. Owners who have economic relations with the firm will be interested in protecting their interests nonetheless if it is reasonably evident that such protection will result in poor exertion. According to Thomsen and Pedersen (1997) avers that chat up a dual reference as owners and lenders would discourage risque risk projects with great profit latent because such projects whitethorn hinder the firm from meeting its financial obligations if the project fails to fulfil its expected cash flows. The disposal to a fault plays a dual role in that it serves as both an owner and a regulator. Therefore owners who play a dual role in the firm ofttimes baptistery a trade-off among promoting the creation of shareholder value and meeting their other specific objectives (Hill and Jones, 1992).Existing corporate governance frameworks have often ignored these issues in UAE. Rather, much of the emphasis has been on the effectiveness of the lineup in ensuring that top management is working towards meeting the goals of shareholders. Present corporate governance frameworks lack the ability to monitor owners and their influence on top management. The framework lacks the ability to align the role played by firm owners, board of directors and managers interests and actions with the creation of shareholder value and welfare motivation of stakeholders. intervention of the possible future structure of the industry          The joined Arabs Emirates, and mainly Abu Dhabi, is endure to step-up its economy by reducing the total ratio advert of hydrocarbons to Gross Domestic Product. This is soon being done by maturement investment in sector areas the likes of services in telecommunication, education, media, healthcare, tourism, aviation, metals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, exaltation and trade.Significant investments have been made by United Arab Emirates to leaven itself as a regional trade hub. United Arab Emirates is as well member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, there are ongoing negotiations to establish free trade agreements with other regions and countries such as the EU. These factors will get arrogantly to the regions integration into the global economy. United Arab Emirates is currently working towards diversifying their economies from the embrocate sector into other sectors. This diversification is expected not only to increase trade among member countries but also to increase the regions trade with other countries and regions (Sturm et al., 2008).How the structure affects strategy decisions           possession structure has an stupor on firm mathematica l operation in United Arab Emirates energy production owned sector. This region has witnessed pregnant economic harvest-time over the last some decades. The region is also facing peeved times with note to corporate governance practices, resulting in poor firm military operation. corporate governance issues are not limited to the United Arabs Emirates as fictitious character of GCC Countries. From a global point of view, corporate governance has witnessed significant transformations over the last decade (Gomez and Korine, 2005). As a result, there has been an interest in the research attention accorded to corporate governance. The credibility of current corporate governance structures has come under scrutiny owing to recent corporate failures and low corporate performance across the world.The risk aversion of the firm can be directly affected by the will power structure in place. say-so problems occur as a result of conflict in interests surrounded by principals (owners) and agents (managers) (Leech and Leahy, 1991). The board of directors is thereby regarded as an intermediary in the midst of managers and owners. The board of directors plays four important roles in the firm. These include observe, stewardship, monitor and coverage. The board of directors monitors and controls the discretion of top management. The board of directors influences managerial discretion in cardinal government agencys internal influences which are imposed by the board and external influences which relate to the role played by the market in monitoring and sanctioning managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 2000).B Contribution of the sector to the economy of your chosen enationAnalysis of contribution of sector          United Arab Emirates remain major global economic player because it has the exaltedest cover colour reserves. UAE together with the other Gulf Cooperation Council accounts for over 40% of global oil reserves and remains important in tallying the global economy with oil in future. As a result, investment spending on oil exploration and development of sassy oil fields is on the rise (Sturm et al., 2008).Global oil requisite is currently on the rise. This growth is driven mainly by appear market economies, as well as the oil producing UAE as part of GCC countries. In addition, Europe and the U.S are witnessing depletions in their oil reserves. This convey that these regions will become increasely dependent on the Gulf region which includes UAE for the supply of oil (Sturm et al., 2008). The importance of the United Arabs Emirates as a global economic player is therefore expected to increase dramatically in the get along futureUse of appropriate data and other depict           By the year 2011, the GDP of United Arab Emirates totaled to 360.2 billion dollars. Subsequently in 2001, yearly growth of GNP varied from about 7.4% to 30.7%. As part of the chief crude oil suppliers, the Unit ed Arab Emirates was at setoff swerve off from the universal recession by high prices on oil that rose to a record 147 US dollars per barrel in the month of July in 2008. Nevertheless, the nation was ultimately influenced by the excavating worldwide recession which resulted to a decline in oil demand, reducing the oil prices to a cut back amount not exceeding a third of the peak of July 2008. In the last 2008 months, the trembles rumbling through global economies were lastly go through in this section.Oil (million barrels)    Proved reserves, 2013 Total oil supply (thousand barrelful/d), 2012 Total petroleum consumption, 2012 Reserves-to-production ratio97,800 3,213 618 95Natural Gas (billion blockish feet)Proved reserves, 2013 Dry natural hit man production, 2012 Dry natural gas consumption, 2012 Reserves-to-production ratio215,025 1,854 2,235 116UAE summary energy statisticsC Critical appraisal of sustainability targets on traffic plan of your chosen organisationO il firms in United Arab Emirates is still quite immature. Most businesses are controlled by a few shareholders and family self-control is prevalent. Most large and small businesses are family businesses (Saidi, 2004). The disk operating system is also significantly involved in the management of companies (Union of Arab Banks, 2003).This is contrary to the status quo in westbound democracies where firms are owned by a diverse aggroup of shareholders which makes self-control to be completely divide from control. The self-will structure in United Arab Emirates suggests that stewardship and monitoring aspects of non-executive directors (NEDs) is absent in firms based in United Arab Emirates. self-command tightfistedness has remained high in the region because of practices such as rights issues which enable existing wealthy shareholders, and influential families to subscribe to new shares in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Musa, 2002).According to a study of the corporate go vernance practices of five countries by the Union of Arab Banks (2003), possession of corporations is concentrated in the hand of families. In addition, corporate boards are dominated by controlling shareholders, their relatives and friends (Union of Arab Banks, 2003). There is a no clear separation between control and ownership. ratiocination making is dominated by shareholders. The number of independent directors in the board is very small and the functions of the CEO and Chairman are carried out by the same person. The high concentration in firm ownership therefore undermines the principles of good corporate governance that are prevalent in Hesperian settings (Yasin and Shehab, 2004). This turn up is consistent with findings by the World Bank (2003) in an investigation of corporate governance practices in the Middle eastern United States no(prenominal)th Africa (MENA) region which also includes the Gulf region.1.0 Objective of semiempirical evidence        & nbsp  The empirical evidence on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance is mixed. Different studies have made use of different stype Ales to arrive at different, contradictory and sometimes difficult to compare mop ups. The literature suggests that there are two main ownership structures in firm including dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. With repute to concentrated ownership, most of the empirical evidence suggests that concentrated ownership detrimentally affects performance (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000 Gugler and Weigand, 2003 Grosfeld, 2006 Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Different studies have also focused on how specifically concentrated ownership structures affect firm performance. For ex adenosine monophosphatele, with respect to governance ownership, Jefferson (1998), Stiglitz (1996), and sunshine et al. (2002) provide theoretical arguments that government ownership is believably to collaterally affect firm performance because government ow nership can facilitate the resolution of issues regarding the ambiguous retention rights.However, Xu and Wang (1999) and Sun and Tong (2003) provide empirical evidence that government ownership has a cast out impact on firm performance. On the contrary, Sun et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence that government ownership has a positivist impact on firm performance. It has also been argued that the kinship between government ownership and firm performance is non-linear. another(prenominal) commonly investigated ownership type and its impact on firm performance is family ownership. Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villanonga and Amit (2006), Maury (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006), and Pindado et al. (2008) suggest that there is a positive link between family ownership and firm performance. Despite the positive impact some studies argue that the impact of family ownership is negative.The impact of conflicting ownership has also been investigated. Most of the evidence suggests that f oreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g., Arnold and Javorcik, 2005 Petkova, 2008 Girma, 2005 Girma and Georg, 2006 Girma et al., 2007 Chari et al., 2011 Mattes, 2008).With respect to managerial ownership, it has been argued that the relationship is belike to be positive (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 Chen et al., 2005 Drobetz et al., 2005). Despite this suggestion Demsetz and Lehn (1985) observe a negative relationship between dispersed ownership and firm performance. Institutional ownership has also been found to have a positive impact on firm performance (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990 Han and Suk, 1998 Tsai and Gu, 2007). Furthermore, some studies suggest that there is no link between insider ownership and performance .Very limited studies have been conducted on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in GCC countries like UAE. For ex vitamin Ale, Arouri et al. (2013) provide evidence that bank performance is affected by family ownership, for eign ownership and institutional ownership and that there is no significant impact of government ownership on bank performance. Zeitun and Al-Kawari (2012) observe a significant positive impact of government ownership on firm performance in the Gulf region.The pervasive endogeneity of ownership has been cited as a potential reason why it is difficult to disentangle the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. In addition, the relation whitethorn be a function of the type of firm as well as the layover of observation in the life of the firm. This study is motivated by the mixed results obtained in previous studies and the limited number of studies that have focused on UAE as part of GCC countries. The objective of the study is to explore in more details the factors that motivate particular types of ownership structure and the potential impact of ownership structure and firm performance in the Gulf region2.0 Empirical differentiate          The empirical evidence will focus on how different ownership structures affect firm performance. business firms are often characterized by concentrated and dispersed ownership. Concentrated ownership is expected to have a positive impact on firm performance owning to the increased monitoring that it provides (Grosfeld, 2006).Dispersed ownership has been found to be less frequent than expected. Empirical evidence suggests that most firms are characterized by various forms of ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999). minded(p) this high level of ownership concentration, there has been an increasing concern over the protection of the rights of non-controlling shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000 Gugler and Weigand, 2003). Empirical evidence shows that ownership concentration at best results in poor performance. Concentrated ownership is pricy and has the potential of promoting the exploitation of non-controlling shareholders by controlling shareholders (Grosfeld, 2006). Holmstro m and Tirole (1993) argue that concentrated ownership can contribute to poor liquidity, which can in turn negatively affect performance. In addition, high ownership concentration limits the ability of the firm to diversify. There are various forms of concentrated ownership such as government ownership, family ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. In the succeeding(prenominal) section, the literature review will focus on how these separate ownership structures affect firm performance.2.1.1 Government Ownership           The impact of government ownership on firm performance has cleared the attention of many researchers because the government accounts for the largest proportion of shares of listed companies in some countries and also because government ownership can be used as an instrument of intervention by the government (Kang and Kim, 2012). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that government ownership can contribu te to poor firm performance because Government Owned enterprises often face political rack for profligate job. In addition, it is often difficult to monitor managers of government owned enterprises and there is often a lack of interest in carrying out business process reengineering (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996 Kang and Kim, 2012). Contrary to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) some economists have argued that government ownership can improve firm performance in less developed and emergent economies in particular. This is because government ownership can facilitate the resolution of issues with respect to ambiguous property rights.The empirical evidence on the impact of state ownership on firm performance is mixed. For ex antiophthalmic factorle, Xu and Wang (1999) provide evidence of a negative relationship between state ownership and firm performance based on data for Chinese listed firms over the period 1993-1995. The study, however, fails to find any link between the market-to-book rat io and state ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999). Sun and Tong (2003) employ ownership data from 1994 to 2000 and compares legal person ownership with government ownership. The study provides evidence that government ownership negatively affects firm performance while legal person ownership positively affects firm performance. This conclusion is based on the market-to-book ratio as the measure of firm performance.However, utilise return on sales or gross earnings as the measure of firm performance, the study provides evidence that government ownership has no effect on firm performance. Sun et al. (2002) provide contrary evidence from above. Using data over the period 1994-1997, Sun et al. (2002) provide evidence that both legal person ownership and government ownership had a positive effect on firm performance. They explain their results by suggesting that legal person ownership is another form of government ownership. The above studies track the relationship between government ownersh ip and firm performance as linear. However it has been argued that the relationship is not linear.Huang and Xiao (2012) provide evidence that government ownership has a negative net effect on performance in transition economies. La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence across 92 countries that government ownership of banks contributes negatively to bank performance. The evidence is consistent with boom outc (2005) and cook and Dinc (2005) who investigate government ownership banks in the U.S.2.1.2 Family Ownership         Family ownership is very common in oil firms in UAE. There is a disparity between family ownership and other types of shareholders in that family owners tend to be more interested in the long-term survival of the firm than other types of shareholders(Arosa et al., 2010).. Furthermore, family owners tend to be more concerned about the firms paper of the firm than other shareholders (Arosa et al., 2010). This is because damage to the firms repu tation can also result in damage the familys reputation. Many studies have investigated the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. They provide evidence of a positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003 Villalonga and Amit, 2006 Maury, 2006 Barontini and Caprio, 2006 Pindado et al., 2008).The positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance can be attributed to a number of factors. For ex adenylic acidle, Arosa et al. (2010) suggests that family firms long-term goals indicate that this category of firms desire investment over long horizons than other shareholders. In addition, because there is a significant relationship between the wealth of the family and the value of the family firm, family owners tend to have greater incentives to monitor managers (agents) than other shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Furthermore, family owners would be more interested in go incentives to managers that will make them loyal to the firm.In addition, there is a certain long-term presence of families in family firms with strong intentions to preserve the name of the family. These family members are therefore more apt(predicate) to forego short-term financial rewards so as to enable future generations take over the business and protect the familys reputation (Wang, 2006). In addition, family ownership has positive economic consequences on the business. There are strong control structures that can motivate family members to buy the farm effectively with other shareholders and creditors using higher quality financial reporting with the resulting effect being a reduction in the comprise of pay the business .Furthermore, families are interested in the long-term survival of the firm and family, which reduces the opportunistic behavior of family members with regard to the distribution of earnings and allocation of management, positions.Despite the positive impact of family ownershi p on firm performance, it has been argued that family ownership promotes high ownership concentration, which in turn creates corporate governance problems. In addition, high ownership concentration results in other types of be (Arosa et al., 2010). As primarily mentioned, La Porta et al. (1999) and Vollalonga and Amit (2006) argue that controlling shareholders are likely to squeeze activities that will give them gain unfair advantage over non-controlling shareholders. For example, family firms may be unwilling to pay dividends .Another reason why family ownership can have a negative impact on firm performance is that controlling family shareholders can easily favour their own interests at the expense of non-controlling shareholders by running the company as a family employment service. Under such circumstances, management positions will be limited to family members and erratic dividends will be paid to family shareholders (Demsetz, 1983 Fama and Jensen, 1983 Shleifer and Vishny , 1997). Agency costs may swot up because of dividend payments and management entrenchment (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000 Francis et al., 2005). Families may also have their own interests and concerns that may not be in line with the concerns and interests of other investor groups (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).Schulze et al. (2001) provide a treatment, which suggests that the impact of family ownership on firm performance can be a function of the generation. For example, noting that agency costs often arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control, they argue that first generation family firms tend to have limited agency problems because the management and supervision decisions are made by the same individual. As such agency costs are reduced because the separation of ownership and control has been completely eliminated. Given that there is no separation of ownership and control in the first generation family firm, the firm relationship between family ownership and perf ormance is likely to be positive (Miller and Le-Breton-Miller, 2006). As the firm enters second and third generations, the family property becomes shared by an increasingly large number of family members with diverse interests. The blink of an eye conflict of interests sets in the relationship between family ownership and performance turns negative in accordance to (Chrisman et al., 2005 Sharma et al., 2007). Furthermore, agency problems arise from family relations because family members with control over the firms resources are more likely to be unsparing to their children and other relatives (Schulze et al., 2001).To summarize, the relationship between family ownership and firm performance may be non-linear. This means that the relationship is likely to be positive and negative at the same time. To support this contention, a number of studies have ascertained a non-linear relationship between family ownership and firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003 Maury, 2006). This means that when ownership is less concentrated, family ownership is likely to have a positive impact on firm performance. As the family ownership concentration increases, minority shareholders tend to be exploited by family owners and thus the impact of family ownership on firm performance tends negative.Small countries have a relatively weak diamond of competitive advantages (Vlahini-Dizdarevi 2006).D. Analysis1.0 Potters ball field ModelThe competitive forces advantages or analysis ought to be fixed on the main competition factors and its impact analysis on the business ( porter 1998, p.142). The state, and seat wealth cannot be inherited -3554730607695Faktorski uvjeti00Faktorski uvjeti-27546301293495Vezane i podravajue industrije00Vezane i podravajue industrije-332041536195ansa00ansa it ought to be produced (Porter 1998, p.155). This wealth is influenced by the ability of industry to continually wage increase and innovate itself, and this is achievable exclusively by increase means in production in all parts of fiscal action. The model of Porter concerns aspect which circuitously or openly affects advantage of competition. The aspect structure a place where given manufacturing sector like in this case, oil sector, state or region a learn and act on the way of competing in that environment. (Porter 1998, p. 165).Left0            Each diamond (oil) and the field of diamond (oil) as the entirely structure consists of main influences that makes the oil sector competition to be successive. These influences think every ability and resource vital for competitive advantage of the sector data forming the opportunity and providing the response to how accessible abilities and resources ought to be ruled each(prenominal) interest group aim and the is most crucial, oil sector pressure to innovating and investing.SWOT ANALYSISStrengthsThe oil sector has many years producing oil and so is well established.Comparatively lots of sub-sectors f or industrialist stability and support.WeaknessesComparatively out of date scientific foundation.Inadequate well educated professionals and residents in comparing to the new industry needs.Lesser costs of work cost in oil sector due to low salary from regular salaries in UAE.OpportunitiesThe likelihood for resources application of EU agreement funds, as is the state resources passably good quality of 11 % graduate students share that are likely to be absorbed into this oil sector.Contribution in motivational and investment projects that help in developing the economy of UAE every time.ThreatsExpansion of oil production capacity of economies of South-Eastern that have competed with low prices of products and little costs of production. loan jobs and production globalisation.Reinforcement of local competition of adjacent economies, and thus reinforcing actions that attract direct overseas exploitation of the oil sector in UAE through investments. acknowledgmentsAdmati, Pfleiderer, P. , Z. 1994. 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